



ACADEMIC SECURITY AND COUNTER EXPLOITATION PROGRAM

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# THE OPEN SOURCE MEDIA SUMMARY

**November 10, 2021**

## **DISA MOVES TO COMBAT INTENSIFYING CYBER THREATS WITH ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE**

*Brandi Vincent | Nextgov | November 1, 2021*

In the near term, Defense Information Systems Agency officials plan to strategically employ artificial intelligence capabilities for defensive cyber operations. "First of all, the threat has never been higher. It's also been commoditized: Malware has become commercialized as essentially organized crime on an international scale," Deputy Commander of the Joint Force Headquarters-Department of Defense Information Network Rear Adm. William Chase III, told reporters during a media roundtable last week. "So, one of the first questions we have to ask ourselves is: 'What are we actually vulnerable to?'" The press event was associated with DISA's Forecast to Industry and the release of its strategic plan for 2022 through 2024. That document organizes some of the agency's broad aims to "accelerate [its] efforts to connect and protect the warfighter in cyberspace" as the conflict landscape evolves. The vision includes lines of effort promoting activities to ultimately implement and refine a global network infrastructure and unified capabilities, such as "leverage data as a center of gravity," and "drive force readiness through innovation."

Read the full article [here](#).

## **HOW CHINESE STRATEGISTS THINK AI WILL POWER A MILITARY LEAP AHEAD**

*Ben Noon and Chris Bassler | Defense One | September 17, 2021*

The People's Liberation Army has yet to adopt a definition, let alone a formal plan, for "intelligentization," a Chinese vision for the transformation of warfare through artificial intelligence and automation. But Chinese military theorists see it as a rare opportunity for "leapfrog development" over adversaries. One author suggests that Star Wars will "become a reality"; another says the fantasies from "mythological fiction" will come true. Their writings, while not authoritative, have coalesced around several key themes that offer a crucial glimpse into potential PLA thinking and ambitions. The PLA internalized lessons on "mechanization" and "platform-centric warfare" from the Second World War, and on "informationization" and networked operations from U.S. operations in the 1991 Gulf War. Whereas these earlier eras of warfare turned on "mechanization" in the "physical space" and "informationization" in the "information space," PLA theorists argue that intelligentization will center upon a "cognitive space" that privileges complex thinking and effective decision-making.

Read the full article [here](#).



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## **JURY CONVICTS CHINESE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER OF ESPIONAGE CRIMES, ATTEMPTING TO STEAL TRADE SECRETS**

*The United States Department of Justice | November 5, 2021*

A federal jury today convicted Yanjun Xu, a Chinese national and Deputy Division Director of the Sixth Bureau of the Jiangsu Province Ministry of State Security, of conspiring to and attempting to commit economic espionage and theft of trade secrets. The defendant is the first Chinese intelligence officer to be extradited to the United States to stand trial. "This conviction of a card-carrying intelligence officer for economic espionage underscores that trade secret theft is integral to the PRC government's plans to modernize its industries," said Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen of the Justice Department's National Security Division. "But this conviction also serves notice that the United States will not sit by as China, or any other nation-state, attempts to steal instead of researching and developing key technology. Instead, and with the support of our allies, we will continue to investigate, prosecute, and hold accountable those who try to take the fruits of American ingenuity illegally."

Read the full article [here](#).

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## **THE BATTLE TO KEEP CHINA OFF EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES**

*The Week | November 1, 2021*

German universities have been ordered to review their links with China after the country's education minister warned of Beijing's "high-level influence". Anja Karliczek, a member of the centre-right Christian Democratic Union, said Chinese influence over universities was "unacceptable" after "the launch of a German biography" of China's president Xi Jinping "was cancelled under alleged diplomatic pressure", The Times said. "China has established about 550 state-funded Confucius institutes around the world," the paper added, including "about 20 in Germany and 30 in the UK". But the claim that pressure from Beijing led to the shelving of the German book launch has raised questions over whether the Confucius institutes "spread propaganda for the Chinese Communist Party". Journalists Stefan Aust and Adrian Geiges had been scheduled to introduce their book, *Xi Jinping: The World's Most Powerful Man*, at an event organised by the Confucius institutes in Hanover and Duisburg-Essen. But the publisher has "claimed that the Chinese consul general in Dusseldorf forced" the institutions to cancel the online talk, The Times said.

Read the full article [here](#).

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## **RIISING TO THE CHALLENGE: NAVIGATING COMPETITION, AVOIDING CRISIS, AND ADVANCING US INTERESTS IN RELATIONS WITH CHINA**

*John R. Allen, Ryan Hass, and Bruce Jones | Brookings | November 2021*

The Brookings – China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) Dialogue began in 2019 against the backdrop of the 40th anniversary of the establishment of U.S.-China diplomatic relations. By that time, it already had become clear that the previous framework for managing bilateral relations was fraying, and that a form of strategic rivalry was the new baseline reality of the relationship. In the intervening two years, American policymakers and analysts have laid out two main alternative frameworks for the management of U.S.-China relations for the coming decades. One is a strategy of omni-directional containment, seeking to confront and constrain China — limiting China's expanding capacity in the military, technological, economic, developmental, normative, and multilateral spheres; undermining the legitimacy of its governance and economic models; and seeking to blunt China's diplomatic gains. Although there is a coherence to this approach, it also carries costs and risks. It could limit buy-in from key allies and partners, inhibit calibrated U.S.-China coordination on the provision of critical global public goods, and diminish the capacity of both major powers to manage tensions.

Read the full article [here](#).



## **MITIGATING THREATS TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN GERMANY: THE ROLE OF THE STATE, UNIVERSITIES, LEARNED SOCIETIES AND CHINA**

*Andreas Fulda and David Missal | The International Journal of Human Rights | October 21, 2021*

The International Journal of Human Rights, an academic journal, has published a study on academic freedom in Germany. The study argues that German state, universities, and scholarly societies have so far failed to properly identify and mitigate threats to academic freedom emanating from state and non-state agents under the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The study details how the Chinese government influences Germany's academia through informal social networks, party-state funding of German universities, and the dependence among some German China scholars on 'official China.' The authors probe whether or not the ecosystem of organised academia in Germany provides sufficient academic autonomy for scholars to conduct their research without fear or favour. Despite constitutional guarantees of academic freedom, academics face multiple threats from populist politicians, dubious third party funding, uncivil society, and misguided developments within German academia itself.

Read the full article [here](#).

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## **HOW WASHINGTON'S HAWKISH CHINA POLICY ALIENATES YOUNG CHINESE**

*Cheng Li | Brookings | November 4, 2021*

A Chinese social media post recently highlighted the following joke: A college student from China says to his American classmate: "I want to study propaganda in the United States." "There is no such thing as propaganda in the United States," the American student replies. The Chinese student says, "Yes, that's exactly what I want to study." The joke reflects growing cynicism, criticism and disappointment among young Chinese regarding domestic governance and foreign policy in the United States. The drastic deterioration of U.S.-China relations over the past two years has aggravated and reenforced suspicions, fears and animosities. Blame games, propaganda wars and conspiracy theories have arisen from both sides of the Pacific. Nationalism and anti-American sentiment are particularly evident among young Chinese, including those who have previously studied or are currently studying in the United States. As political scientist Jessica Chen Weiss of Cornell University recently observed, young Chinese people today are "more hawkish in their foreign policy beliefs than older generations."

Read the full article [here](#).

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## **MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

*United States Department of Defense | 2021*

The Department of Defense (DoD) annual report to Congress on military and security developments involving the People's Republic of China (PRC) provides a baseline assessment of the Department's pacing challenge. The PRC has long viewed the United States as a competitor and has characterized its view of strategic competition in terms of a rivalry among powerful nation states, as well as a clash of opposing systems. As expressed in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, the PRC is the only competitor capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system. The PRC is increasingly clear in its ambitions and intentions. Beijing seeks to reshape the international order to better align with its authoritarian system and national interests, as a vital component of its strategy to achieve the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation."

Read the full article [here](#).



# INSIDER THREAT MITIGATION FOR U.S. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ENTITIES: GUIDELINES FROM AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE

*The National Counterintelligence and Security Center | March 2021*

The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America, 2020-2022 highlights the expanding and evolving nature of threats to U.S. critical infrastructure organizations from foreign state and non-state actors. Foreign adversaries are no longer simply targeting the U.S. government, as was often the case during the Cold War, but today are using their sophisticated intelligence capabilities against a much broader set of targets, including U.S. critical infrastructure and other private sector and academic entities. These U.S. industry and academic organizations are now squarely in the geopolitical battlespace. Among other activities, foreign threat actors are collecting large sets of public and non-public data about these organizations and their workforces at an unprecedented level. By combining this information with advanced data analytic capabilities and other tools, foreign adversaries are afforded vast opportunities to identify, target, and exploit vulnerable people in U.S. workforces to further their geopolitical interests at America's expense. Their strengths are identifying our weaknesses and our threats are their opportunities.

Read the full article [here](#).

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## HOW CYBER HYGIENE PROMOTES INFORMATION AND DATA SECURITY FOR RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS IN A NEW ERA FOR REMOTE WORK

*Anne Pifer, Merritt Neale, Matthew Tryniecki, and Greg Smith | Huron | 2021*

In March 2020, in-person teaching and learning were brought to a halt nearly overnight as governments, colleges and universities acted to prevent the spread of the COVID-19 virus. While higher education administrators and faculty scrambled to transition to a remote teaching and learning model as physical campuses were closed, they also struggled to respond to unique research needs regarding wet and dry lab operations and clinical research conduct. Instantly, many researchers began accessing data and continuing to track project plans from home, with or without appropriate information security safeguards provided by their institutions. More than a year later, some institutions are rethinking the need to provide dedicated physical space for research faculty, staff and administrators who don't require labs or special equipment on campus.

Read the full article [here](#).

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## PROTECTING CRITICAL AND EMERGING U.S. TECHNOLOGIES FROM FOREIGN THREATS

*The National Counterintelligence and Security Center | October 2021*

Given the unique opportunities and challenges posed by emerging technologies, the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) today announced it is prioritizing its industry outreach efforts in a select few U.S. technology sectors where the stakes are potentially greatest for U.S. economic and national security. These sectors produce technologies that may determine whether America remains the world's leading superpower or is eclipsed by strategic competitors in the next few years. These sectors include, but are not limited to: artificial intelligence, bioeconomy, autonomous systems, quantum, and semiconductors. As mandated by Congress, a core NCSC mission is to conduct counterintelligence (CI) outreach to the U.S. private sector, academic and research communities, as well as other external stakeholders to arm them with information about foreign intelligence threats to their organizations and ways to mitigate risk.

Read the full article [here](#).



## CHINA CONDUCTS INFLUENCE OPERATIONS TO TARGET MEDIA, BUSINESSES IN US, OTHER COUNTRIES

Devdiscourse | March 11, 2021

China conducts influence operations, which target cultural institutions, media organisations, business, academic, and policy communities in the US, other countries, and international institutions, to achieve outcomes favourable to its strategic objectives, Pentagon said in its recent report on Wednesday. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seeks to condition domestic, foreign, and multilateral political establishments and public opinion to accept Beijing's narratives and remove obstacles preventing the attainment of goals, stated the Pentagon 2021 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC. CCP leaders probably consider open democracies, including the US, as more susceptible to influence operations than other types of governments, the report read. The PLA has emphasised the development of its "Three Warfares" concept- comprised of psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare -- in its operational planning since at least 2003, US Defence Department said. T

Read the full article [here](#).

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## THE SPYING GAME: CHINA'S GLOBAL NETWORK

Frank Gardner | BBC News | July 7, 2020

The latest controversy to swirl around the Chinese telecoms company Huawei has shone a spotlight on the murky world of Chinese espionage, agent-recruitment and an ambitious programme of extending its influence across the globe. So how extensive is it, how does it work and who runs it? A dossier reportedly compiled with the help of a former MI6 spy has accused China of trying to manipulate key UK figures, including politicians, to back the telecom giant's business in Britain. Every major Chinese enterprise anywhere in the world allegedly has an internal "cell" answerable to the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to drive the political agenda and ensure that the company is compliant with political directives. This is why China experts assert that the CCP does operate here in Britain, often under the natural cover of business. "The Party machine is everywhere", says one, adding: "For China, business is inseparable from politics."

Read the full article [here](#).

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