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CHINA'S 14TH FIVE YEAR PLAN AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR DATA CENTERS

Dan Swinhoe | Data Centre Dynamics Ltd | October 12, 2021

As one of the largest and most powerful economies in the world, China's areas of focus should be of interest to companies globally. In its latest Five Year Plan, the Chinese Government has outlined a number of priority areas that could have an impact on both the domestic and global landscape with regards to data centers, semiconductors, and related infrastructure. Based on a practice adopted from the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regularly releases new economic plans every five years. The latest (14th) Plan runs from 2021 to 2025. Amongst other longer-term goals, it aims to make China a "moderately developed" economy by 2035. The 14th Plan doesn't have policies or objectives specifically for data centers – though there is a separate policy document for the sector which we'll discuss later. But the Plan has a direct effect on real estate, investment, energy, and IT, which all feed into the data center realm. "China is pledging innovations combining political ecology and digital economy to handle climate change in pursuing an upgraded commitment to the Paris Agreement," explained a policy brief from French economic research agency, the Center for Prospective Studies and International Information (CEPII).

Read the full article [here](#).

TOP U.S. SCIENCE FUNDER SAYS IT IS SWAMPED BY INVESTIGATIONS OF FOREIGN INFLUENCE ON GRANTEES

Jeffrey Mervis | Science Insider | October 7, 2021

The in-house watchdog at the National Science Foundation says her office is unable to keep up with investigating the soaring number of allegations that grantees have ignored rules requiring them to disclose support from China and other countries when seeking NSF funding. "These cases [of foreign influence] now make up 63% of our caseload ... we don't have the resources we need to investigate these allegations," NSF Inspector General Allison Lerner told the science committee of the U.S. House of Representatives this week at a hearing on how to preserve research security without jeopardizing international scientific collaborations. In her written testimony, Lerner reported that NSF has recovered \$7.9 million from 23 grantees, at 21 institutions, who it found violated the agency's disclosure rules. NSF also imposed a range of sanctions on the researchers. All but one of the cases involve an award to a scientist with links to China.

Read the full article [here](#).



THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL TALENT IN QUANTUM INFORMATION SCIENCE

National Science & Technology Council | National Quantum Initiative | October 2021

Quantum Information Science and Technology (QIST) has substantial scientific, economic, and national security implications. Maintaining leadership in this critical emerging technology will depend on growing a diverse and expert workforce, especially as the global pace of QIST research and development (R&D) increases. Talent required to develop QIST is currently in short supply, both nationally and internationally. Global investments in QIST are intensifying the workforce shortage as countries strive to produce, attract, and retain top talent. Increasing the capacity for QIST R&D in companies, universities, and national laboratories, and the Federal government will require a sustained commitment to grow a diverse and expert workforce. Welcoming international researchers and fostering international cooperation will remain important.

Read the full article [here](#).

BALANCING OPEN SCIENCE AND SECURITY IN THE U.S. RESEARCH ENTERPRISE

U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology | October 5, 2021

Good morning, and welcome to our members and our panelists. Thank you for joining us today. Collaboration is the lifeblood of scientific discovery. Scientists build upon one another's work, across time and around the globe. Openness in science allows reproduction and replication of work, increasing the reliability of conclusions and building public trust. It fosters cooperation across disciplines, brings in new perspectives, and sparks ideas that wouldn't come from one solitary lab, or even one country. The COVID-19 pandemic has driven home the importance of international collaboration in science. In those early months, before the virus had been detected on our shores, American scientists and health authorities were dependent upon researchers in impacted countries to share what they knew about the virus, how it spread, and how it killed. Over a year in, collaboration with international partners is still vital to detect emerging variants as early as possible and assess vaccine efficacy. International problems require international solutions.

Read the full article [here](#).

CISA RELEASES NEW TOOL TO HELP ORGANIZATIONS GUARD AGAINST INSIDER THREATS

Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency | October 5, 2021

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released an Insider Risk Mitigation Self-Assessment Tool (for best results, please download and open with Adobe) today, which assists public and private sector organizations in assessing their vulnerability to an insider threat. By answering a series of questions, users receive feedback they can use to gauge their risk posture. The tool will also help users further understand the nature of insider threats and take steps to create their own prevention and mitigation programs. "While security efforts often focus on external threats, often the biggest threat can be found inside the organization," said CISA Executive Assistant Director for Infrastructure Security David Mussington. "CISA urges all our partners, especially small and medium businesses who may have limited resources, to use this new tool to develop a plan to guard against insider threats. Taking some small steps today can make a big difference in preventing or mitigating the consequences of an insider threat in the future."

Read the full article [here](#).



CIA CREATES CHINA CENTER TO SHIFT TO GREAT POWER COMPETITION

Jacqueline Feldscher | Defense One | October 8, 2021

The CIA's new China Mission Center sends a clear signal to the intelligence community that it's time to shift its focus to near-peer competitors after 20 years of tracking terrorist threats, two analysts said. The center is part of the administration's broader effort to pivot the national security community's focus towards competition with great powers, such as China, and away from the counterterrorism operations that dominated the past two decades, including the war in Afghanistan that ended this summer. CIA Director William Burns announced on Thursday that the new China Mission Center will bring together capabilities from around the agency to better respond to the threat posed by Beijing. "CMC will further strengthen our collective work on the most important geopolitical threat we face in the 21st century, an increasingly adversarial Chinese government," Burns said in a statement. The intelligence community's China capabilities are lacking, said Robert Ashley Jr., a retired Army officer who led the Defense Intelligence Agency from 2017 to 2020.

Read the full article [here](#).

WE NEED TO SEPARATE VIEWS OF CHINA FROM ETHNICITY

Ciara Morris | Australian Institute of International Affairs | October 13, 2021

Australia and Canada are Western middle-power democracies and US allies that struggle to manage relations with an increasingly assertive and powerful PRC. This is causing unnecessary hardship for Chinese Australians and Canadians. There are over 1.2 million Australians of Chinese heritage living in Australia, making up 5.6 percent of the population. Similarly, there are over 1.7 million Canadians of Chinese heritage living in Canada, making up 5.1 percent of the population. Reports from Human Rights Watch in Australia and Amnesty International in Canada show how people of Chinese heritage in both countries are subject to foreign interference from state and party officials, as well as passionately nationalistic citizens of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Not to be mistaken with legitimate foreign influence – the aim of diplomacy of all countries – foreign interference is the use of illegal or coercive measures to interfere in another country's society, or the intimidation or harassment of another country's citizens.

Read the full article [here](#).

US-CHINA RESEARCH COLLABORATION: A CALL TO ACTION

Brad Farnsworth | University World News | October 9, 2021

Since the late 1970s, when China started re-opening to the West, Chinese universities have made important contributions to the country's economic development through global engagement: they have increased research productivity, risen in the world rankings and served as the headwaters for downstream commercial development. In order to achieve these goals, the Chinese state has given universities substantial autonomy when it comes to global engagement and transnational research collaboration. It is difficult to reconcile this history with recent arguments that the goal of the Chinese state is to expropriate intellectual property by any means necessary, including through academic research networks. Largely playing by established global norms has strengthened China's universities in ways that support its goals for national development. While China is moving aggressively to reduce its dependence on the West in many areas, there are no signs of this trend in higher education. In fact, my conversations with Chinese leaders suggest that collaboration in higher education is seen as an area of stability among many other areas of sharp contention.

Read the full article [here](#).



FEDERAL RESEARCH: AGENCY ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS FOREIGN INFLUENCE

United States Government Accountability Office | October 5, 2021

U.S. research may be subject to undue foreign influence in cases where a researcher has a foreign conflict of interest (COI). Federal grant-making agencies such as the National Science Foundation (NSF) can address this threat through COI policies and requiring the disclosure of information that may indicate conflicts. In a December 2020 report, GAO reviewed five agencies, including NSF, which together accounted for almost 90 percent of all federal research and development expenditures at universities in fiscal year 2018. GAO found that three of the agencies it reviewed have agency-wide COI policies and two do not (see figure). The three agencies with existing COI policies focus on financial interests and do not specifically address or define non-financial interests, which may include multiple professional appointments. In the absence of agency-wide COI policies and definitions for non-financial interests, researchers may not fully understand what they need to report on their grant proposals, leaving agencies with incomplete information to assess the risk of foreign influence.

Read the full article [here](#).

DEFENDING ACADEMIC FREEDOM NEEDS DECISIVE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Andreas Fulda | University World News | October 7, 2021

The debacle surrounding Christian Democrat Armin Laschet's performance in the elections marks a turning point in German politics. Coalition talks are now well under way. They point to a new government that is likely to adopt a more assertive approach towards China. Such a stance will also have repercussions for Germany's science policy. At the recent federal election both the Greens and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) made major gains among young Germans. They can now play kingmakers when it comes to the new government. It is widely assumed that the Greens and FDP will enter a so-called 'traffic light' coalition with the other winner of the election, the Social Democrat (SPD) Olaf Scholz. The managing director of the Centre for Liberal Modernity, Ralf Fücks, has called it an opportunity to promote ecological and social liberal reforms. The election result also has the potential to upend Angela Merkel's mercantilist policy towards China. In June 2021 two prominent German politicians from the Greens and FDP formulated nine bipartisan recommendations on how to work with China as a systemic rival.

Read the full article [here](#).

A STAKEHOLDERS' PERSPECTIVE ON RISK MANAGEMENT FOR COLLABORATIVE UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY R&D PROGRAMS

Gabriela Fernandes, Joana Domingues, Anabela Teres, Eduardo Pinto | ScienceDirect | 2021

University-industry collaborative programs provide special challenges in understanding and expressing the value of risk management (RM) in delivering program and project benefits. This paper presents a methodology for managing the risks in major university-industry R&D programs within a stakeholders' perspective. An ethnographic study was conducted on a multi-million euro university-industry collaboration initiative. The RM methodology identifies, for each of the key stakeholders, the RM activities in the program, which are largely derived from research literature. Empirical research then prioritizes and selects key RM activities. The research is informed using a case study involving one university and one large industrial partner. Empirical research was conducted by researchers who observed, for five years, at close quarters, the challenges of managing risk in major collaborative programs.

Read the full article [here](#).



SAFEGUARDS NEEDED FOR ACADEMIA AS FOREIGN INFLUENCE BILL PASSES

Yojana Sharma | University World News | October 6, 2021

The Singapore parliament this week passed legislation to counter foreign interference that could threaten its national security and sovereignty, amid growing concerns globally about the use of digital tools and campaigns by foreigners to advance their national interests abroad. But critics said the law could impact on free speech and academic freedom and academics are calling for more safeguards for free and open inquiry and research. The Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act or FICA was passed on 4 October with just three amendments, after the bill was first unveiled a month ago. FICA aims to prevent foreign actors from interfering in local politics by giving the state the power to shut down hostile information campaigns and direct internet service providers to block such content from being seen in Singapore.

Read the full article [here](#).

SEE SOMETHING, SAY SOMETHING

Stephen Hickok | Defense Contract Management Agency | September 21, 2021

Insider threats can cause significant damage to our people and national security. The Defense Contract Management Agency and the Department of Defense take the obligation to protect people and assets seriously, whether the threats come from internal or external sources. Effective insider threat mitigation requires a coordinated and consolidated approach to security policies and reporting potential threats. The DoD Insider Threat Program is designed to prevent, deter, detect and mitigate actions by malicious insiders who represent a threat to national security or DoD personnel, facilities, operations and resources through the integration and synchronization of the full range of security, counterintelligence, cybersecurity, civilian and military personnel management, workplace violence, emergency management, law enforcement and antiterrorism programs.

Read the full article [here](#).

FRAMING CHINA'S RISE IN THE UNITED STATES, AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

David M McCourt | Oxford Academic | May 2021

Optimism about China's rise has in recent years given way to deep concern in the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom. Drawing on an original set of interviews with China experts from each country, and an array of primary and secondary sources, I show that shifting framings of China's rise reflect the dynamics of the US, Australian and UK national security fields. The article highlights three features specifically: first, the US field features a belief that China's rise can be arrested or prevented, absent in Australia and the UK. I root this dynamic in the system of professional appointments and the intense US 'marketplace of ideas', which gives rise to intense framing contestation and occasional sharp frame change. relations with China.

Read the full article [here](#).

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